liveness testing can prevent physical attacks like these that do not compromise the system, but signal injection attacks Migration from password and token-based authentication in will continue to be possible because sensors do not bind the distributed systems requires fundamental changes to the sample to the identity of the sensor or the time that the authentication process. A person's biometric data is not a sample was taken. For instance, retina scanning, which secret, which presents a fundamental difference with other would be very difficult to spoof through physical means, authentication methods. Matching a sample with a database can still be recorded and replayed at the sensor level. The template is secondary to establishing trust in the integrity of use of templates protects privacy and prevents reuse of the sample. The process is similar to establishing a chain of biometric samples between systems [11], but there is little to custody for judicial evidence. In computer systems this is prevent a dishonest party from capturing a biometric in raw accomplished using attestation architectures. In this paper, form to be used as a live sample in another system. As a design for a secure remote biometric login system based biometric identification becomes widespread, people will on an attestation architecture is analyzed. The system uses a become accustomed to frequently providing biometric commercially available Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to samples, and the possibility of a Trojan sample acquisition authenticate the platform during the boot process and or a dishonest administrator is realistic. The result is similar perform trusted private-key functions to participate in a to using the same password for multiple systems. When challenge/response between the client and a remote personal biometrics are no longer a secret, then how can an biometric matcher. The result is a system that can provide automated system be sure that a biometric sample is coming higher assurance than current systems in an economically from a biometric device and not recorded data? and administratively feasible system. Consequently, biometric samples must be treated more like evidence and less like a password.
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Consequently, biometric samples must be treated more like evidence and less like a password. Using a local biometric match to unlock a key, which is an insecure system provides little benefit, and there is no used as the network login credential, can be even less secure distinction between a valid platform and an attacker's than using a password. A biometric match is typically a platform that can provide the same credentials. The Boolean value (after thresholding), providing no protection opportunity for an attacker to insert or capture a live sample beyond code obfuscation, which is difficult to quantify. starts with the end sensor and continues up the chain until a Password attacks at least have a measure of protection trusted entity can sign or encrypt the sample. Ideally this through repeated hashing to slow down a brute force attack. would occur in the sensor itself, but this would require key Even if sufficient protection is provided to enforce that a management at the device level. Providing tamper valid live sample is used to unlock the key, what mechanism resistance, enrollment and revocation at the device level prevents an attacker from using an electronic copy of a valid would be ideal, but it is not considered in this paper due to live sample to the matching algorithm? the large administrative burden.
Using a TPM to enhance the security of a biometric Instead it is more reasonable to establish a chain of login is not a new idea, and there are multiple commercial integrity within the platform and sign the sample by the solutions and research concepts using this widely available local root of trust. The level of trust in the signature security tool [1, 3] . However, current systems only provide depends on the ability to protect the key and the ability to a wrapper around legacy password based systems (a authenticate requests to use the key. If the key is protected successful biometric match unlocks a password cache). by tamper resistant hardware, and if the authenticity of the This places full trust in an end device that could be software is verified prior to signing, then this establishes a subjected to a rigorous offline attack. Current systems also trusted relationship between the platform and the live do not provide sufficient authentication of the software on sample. This can be accomplished using a commercially the platform used to collect the biometric sample. For available attestation architecture, where components vouch instance, current systems do not detect if the device driver for the validity of information by signing with a private key.
has been altered to send a spoofed sample rather than read In this research, the Trusted Computing Group's (TCG) from the device. Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [9] is used in the design of Ratha et. al. proposed a challenge/response system to a secure remote biometric login system. The process alleviate the problem with resubmission attacks on involves a chain of several components, and each verifies biometric devices [5] . In their proposed method, the server the next component. The system remains independent of would generate a random challenge and the sensor would specific biometric technologies using the BioAPI compute a response to the challenge. Their research specification [2] . A remote matching service is used to involves custom sensor devices, which use sensors that are reduce the physical exposure of the final decision point, and able to integrate logic to participate in a challenge/response the remote match is performed as a system independent step system. The research in this paper assumes no changes are that can provide authentication credentials for multiple made to the biometric sensor.
systems.
Chen and others proposed an attestation based system to provide for the integrity of the biometric sample [3] . Their 2. RELATED WORK work required a custom, trusted biometric reader device and a modified TPM capable of performing a biometric match, Given the assumption that raw biometric data cannot be which may not be practical. The research in this paper considered a secret as discussed in the previous section, assumes that an unaltered TPM and a standard biometric approaches that create secret keys or unlock secret keys reader will be used, albeit at the cost of less assurance in the using biometric data are incomplete without integrity capture process. Additionally, rather than performing a verification. This is still true if the algorithms used to local match and releasing a key that provides for a login achieve these ends remain a secret since raw data can be credential, this paper uses a local key to attest that a live injected to replace sensor data. Creation of keys from sample was collected from what appeared to be a valid biometric data removes the need to trust the matching device and then the signed sample is sent to a biometric algorithm, but this is not useful if the biometric sample is matching server. A remote matching server provides not a secret or is not combined with other secrets. additional security measures: it removes the capacity for Uludag et. al. [11] proposed to generate a cryptographic offline attacks of the matching process, it provides increased key using biometric information. Their solution proposed to integrity, and it provides better auditing and management of hide a cryptographic key in the user's biometric template the authentication process. itself. Their solution relies heavily on the robustness of the key hiding and retrieval algorithms, which could be placed Currently, a small program that requests a biometric sample through BioAPI is used to emulate the network client.
METHODOLOGY
The protocol for the login sequence is shown in Figure   2 . All communications between the local client and the The research system uses platform authentication and remote service use 2-way authenticated SSL. Both the local remote matching to create a medium-grade authentication machine and the remote service will contain private keys using a single-factor biometric authentication (which would protected in hardware. When the local machine sends a be backed up by a password and token for users that are login request to the remote service, the remote service will unable to reliably use the system). The hardware of the user return an authentication challenge. The local client will workstation consists of a biometric device (any device with then forward the challenge to the BioAPI, which will a Linux BioAPI device driver) and a complete commodity request a live sample from the biometric device. This and workstation equipped with an embedded TCG compliant subsequent steps involving BioAPI interacting with the TPM. The major software components of the user BAS and the TPM represent new functionality that is workstation consist of a trusted boot loader, operating proposed as an enhancement to the current BioAPI or a new system, network client, BioAPI, and a biometric device layer on top of the current BioAPI. Upon receiving this driver. By using a TPM in a bootstrap process [6] , there is a sample, the BioAPI will request a signature from the TPM measure of assurance that the platform has not been altered for the live sample to make sure the platform being used has and that the proper driver is used to collect the sample.
not been compromised. If the machine is in an approved A Biometric Authentication Server (BAS) is used to state, the TPM will sign the live sample. The TPM will then evaluate the validity of a biometric sample using evidence send the signed live sample back to BioAPI, which will provided by the user workstation as well as match the forward this to the BAS. The BAS will then verify the sample with a known template. To enable validation, a root signature and check for a match. If a match is found and the of trust acknowledged by the BAS must enroll each user signature has been verified, the BAS will send a response workstation. Given a successful validation and match, the for the authentication challenge back to the local client. The BAS returns the requested login credentials -ideally in the local client will send this response to the remote service, form of signed challenges. The BAS is similar to the user where it will be verified. A result is then sent back to the workstation with the exception of the additional BAS local client, either allowing or refusing a login. service software and a reduced set of user applications. Figure 3 . In this system, each layer authenticates the next layer. This ensures The objective of the research system is to prevent most, if integrity as the next layer is not loaded unless the previous not all attacks that do not exploit the capture device. By layer has been approved. By doing this, we can provide using an attestation device as well as a challenge/response evidence that all pertinent software components on the system between the authentication service and the biometric machine are unaltered. authentication service, we can assure that most attacks will be prevented. The result is a system that can prevent many Registers can be compared to reference values at any time.
DAC
An attack using an approved platform is more involved.
This means that not only will all pertinent software be While the platform itself can be approved, the device itself checked during the boot sequence, but if the software is might become compromised at some point, as well as the reloaded at any time while the computer is on, the PCR will software that is used for authentication (BioAPI, net client, recheck the value with the reference value If the values or the device driver), but this would require finding differ, an appropriate action (determined by the user) can be vulnerabilities in these components while still maintaining taken. Examples could be automatically denying access or the appearance of system integrity from the view of the prompting the user for a decision. The advantage to this is preceding component. in situations when the intruder attempts to bypass the boot A man in the middle attack (MIM) would have to rely on check by injecting a virus/worm after the computer has a cryptographic attack or a protocol attack. As stated already booted. earlier, the system will use a 2-way authenticated SSL with
The TPM can also provide additional security by private keys. Therefore, it is difficult for a MIM attack to signing the hash value stored in the PCR. The signed value occur with this system. serves as proof of the state of the remote machine. For a
In the event of software compromise, the attestation server to only read the hash value of a remote machine does mechanism will prevent access in both cases. In one case, not provide assurance that the machine should in fact have the software might be compromised before boot-up. In this case, the software boot chain will fail as the hash check will provide BioAPI compliance, and add additional security fail when the compromised software is checked. In the features. second case, post-boot compromise, the attestation mechanism will check the current state of the software with 6. REFERENCES the hashes held in its registers. If any of the software fails, the attestation mechanism will not sign the live sample and
[1] Anthony Allan, "Security special report: Fingertip security" the authentication will fail.
ComputerWeekly weaknesses with using a biometric authentication system. We have proposed a solution that will alleviate problems created by a lack of secrets by adding verification to the sample collection process. The research system involves adding an attestation device, a Biometric Authentication Server, and biometric independent software. The system is independent of the biometric technology used and does not require single-source or proprietary products. In the future, we hope to be able to completely implement this system,
